In 1983, Özal brought Turkey back to the political center by synthesizing nationalist, conservative, liberal, and social democratic tendencies under a single party umbrella. Erdoğan, on the other hand, transformed these same four tendencies into a fluid coalition of power that is constantly being reconstituted around his leadership. From a unifying model to a leader-centered and divisive alliance… This 40-year transformation is the key to understanding the current state of Turkish politics.
Following the September 12, 1980, coup, the first actions taken by the coup leaders were to shut down all political parties, transfer their assets to the Treasury, and impose a political ban on all former political leaders. Subsequently, a new constitution was drafted and adopted by a referendum held on November 7, 1982. Political parties remained banned for approximately three years following the coup. A law enacted on April 22, 1983, permitted the formation of new political parties. Only founders approved by the National Security Council and a limited number of parties would be allowed to enter the political arena. The parliamentary elections held on November 6, 1983, were among the most interesting in Turkish political history in terms of their results.
In the November 6, 1983, elections, the group behind the coup favored the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), led by retired General Turgut Sunalp, but the election results did not turn out as they had expected. In the elections held on November 6, 1983, the Motherland Party (ANAP), led by Turgut Özal, received a high percentage of the vote and emerged as the leading party. With 45.14 percent of the vote, the Motherland Party secured 211 seats in the 400-member parliament, forming a single-party government, and its leader, Turgut Özal, assumed the office of Prime Minister.
One of the most important factors behind Turgut Özal’s success was his policy of uniting different segments of Turkish politics under a single umbrella when he founded the Motherland Party (ANAP). Through this policy—which we might briefly call “Özal’s Four Trends”—he sought to unite four political currents or trends in Turkish politics: Nationalists, Conservatives, Liberals, and Social Democrats. With this approach, Özal aimed to bring the electorate—which had become fragmented and politically disengaged following the September 12, 1980, coup—back to the political center, and he succeeded in doing so.
Özal’s policy of uniting four political factions not only secured his path to sole power but also established a center-right mass party model that remained influential in Turkish politics for a long time. It enabled him to achieve rapid and far-reaching successes in governing the state. This policy enabled the party to maintain its power by winning the 1984 local elections and the 1987 general elections. It put an end to the sharp right-left polarization, street clashes, and rival factions that had characterized the period before 1980 by bringing them together under one roof. For the first time in history, it brought together peasant, small business owner, religious, nationalist, and secular urban voters under one roof in such large numbers. This situation also had a positive impact on the economy. The transition to a free-market economy accelerated; Turkey successfully shifted from an import-substitution model to an export-driven growth model.
The policy of uniting the four factions did not last long. When Turgut Özal was elected President in 1989 and moved into Çankaya Palace, he lost his charismatic leadership, and his control over the party weakened. Following a 1987 referendum that lifted political bans, former political leaders returned to the scene and rallied their own supporters. The internal conflicts and leadership struggles within the Motherland Party (ANAP) following Özal’s departure led voters to return to their ideological parties. Ultimately, this policy collapsed, closing the door on ANAP’s chance to govern alone in 1991 and ushering in an era of coalitions and political turmoil.
The 1990s went down in Turkish political history as the “Era of Coalitions,” marked by economic crises, instability, and early elections. During this period, the country experienced what was effectively a period of political limbo. The “post-modern” military intervention of February 28, 1997, and the major economic crisis of 2001 were defining events of the era. The failure to implement structural reforms, coupled with high inflation and terrorist attacks, had exacerbated social fatigue. This impasse came to a definitive end in the November 2002 early elections, when all existing parties failed to clear the electoral threshold and the AK Party (AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power as the sole governing party.
Erdoğan and the AKP also had their own four factions in the early years. In fact, rather than “factions,” we could also describe them as “coalitions.” The years that followed would show that Erdoğan would bring new actors into this coalition as needed, and either replace or eliminate them when they were no longer needed. Perhaps we could also describe this as Erdoğan, sitting at the political table, shuffling the cards of actors in his hand and reconfiguring the coalitions he needed.
The AKP initially defined itself as “conservative democratic.” It had sought to reach a broader centrist electorate by distancing itself from its roots in political Islam. In a sense, this was an effort to bring together different segments of society under the “conservative democratic” umbrella. The AKP had become a party capable of drawing votes from conservative, nationalist, liberal, and social democratic segments of society. It was quite successful in its early years. This success was driven by a commitment to greater democratization and human rights, the prospect of EU membership, a platform to fight corruption and poverty, a market economy, and promises made to the private sector.
This situation began to change starting in 2011. Erdoğan’s confidence was indirectly enhanced as military tutelage was pushed back by the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations. The AKP came to power for the third time in the June 12, 2011, elections with approximately 50 percent of the vote. This election granted Erdoğan much stronger legitimacy and self-confidence. Immediately afterward, he began cracking down on the Gülen Movement, which he had previously relied on for manpower in his efforts to dismantle military tutelage. During the same period, the AKP’s liberal wing began to weaken.
Erdoğan began to further centralize and polarize politics with the aim of eliminating groups he viewed as rivals or partners. The truly dramatic shift took place in 2013. First came the Gezi Park protests, followed by the December 17–25 corruption investigations. That same year, the alliance between Erdoğan and the Gülen movement turned into an open power struggle. The period from 2011 to 2013 marked a critical turning point in the AKP’s transition from a pro-democracy image to a more authoritarian political approach.
It is possible to view the Gezi Park events and the December 17–25 incidents not merely as a protest demonstration and a corruption investigation, but as a turning point during which Erdoğan’s power and control over the state were threatened. Erdoğan, who interpreted these events as a “coup attempt,” entered into an open conflict with liberals, democrats, and the Gülen Movement. From this point onward, the elements of the liberal-democratic reform coalition that had existed in the early years of the AKP began to break away one by one.
Between 2013 and 2015, Erdoğan was also pursuing a peace process regarding the Kurdish issue. While clashes were taking place with the Gülen Movement and Gezi protesters on one hand, negotiations with the PKK and Öcalan were continuing on the other. However, the collapse of the peace process in 2015, developments in Syria, and the rise of the HDP forced Erdoğan to recalculate his strategy. Most importantly, in the June 7, 2015, elections, the AKP suffered its first defeat and lost the majority needed to form a single-party government. Coalition talks were deliberately prolonged, plunging the country once again into an election atmosphere. Frightened by the climate of terror and insecurity leading up to the November 7, 2015, elections, voters once again brought the AKP to power on its own. Erdoğan began reshuffling his political coalition cards once more.
The impact of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt—which occurred after all of this and remains shrouded in mystery—on Erdoğan and the AKP was on an entirely different scale. In the aftermath of July 15—which Erdoğan viewed as “a blessing from God”—he not only changed the country’s political system but also restructured the relationships he had previously established with various actors. For this reason, it is possible to view July 15 as the catalyst for a major restructuring of Erdoğan’s political coalition.
The July 15, 2016 coup attempt paved the way for Erdoğan to form a new ruling coalition with the state-centric, nationalist bureaucracy, certain nationalist circles, and deep state structures. A pragmatic rapprochement took place with Ergenekon-linked, nationalist, statist, and Eurasianist circles that had previously opposed the AKP. The transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential system through the 2017 constitutional amendment referendum institutionalized this transformation.
Political power has been concentrated in the person of Erdoğan and in the office of the presidency. In this way, the relationship between the party and the state has been strengthened. The country has been transformed into a one-party state. Elections have not disappeared, but an electoral authoritarian system has emerged. The checks and balances within the state have weakened. Political control over the bureaucracy has increased. A structure based on loyalty rather than merit has been established. Parliament has been rendered ineffective. A structure based on the will of a single individual took shape. Thus, the phrase “one man” was effectively added to the slogan “One nation, one flag, one homeland, one state,” which Erdoğan frequently repeated at rallies.
This is precisely where the fundamental differences between Özal’s and Erdoğan’s tendencies come to light. We can describe the system Erdoğan established not so much as a synthesis of different ideological currents or tendencies within a single party, but rather as a fluid coalition of power formed or reshaped by various political and social forces under Erdoğan’s leadership as needed. Özal had come to power by successfully uniting different tendencies within the ANAP. Erdoğan, on the other hand, is uniting different forces within a state structure and system of power in which he is at the center and holds the reins and control.
The pluralistic and reformist politics that the AKP initially promised upon its founding have, over the past 25 years, given way to the centralization of power, its concentration in the hands of a single individual, and state institutions becoming increasingly dependent on that individual and the political establishment. While Özal sought to synthesize different political tendencies within a single party, Erdoğan preferred to keep different centers of power together through shifting alliances built around his own leadership. From this perspective, the Erdoğan era can be interpreted as a transition in Turkey “from the expansion of centrist politics to the institutionalization of leader-centered power.”
Erdoğan has now formed a new coalition. In this coalition, he has managed to bring together four very different factions. Who is part of this coalition? It includes nationalists, political Islamists, nationalist circles, and Kurdish political groups. The nationalists are represented by the MHP and its cadres. The conservatives are represented by the political Islamists. The others are only considered acceptable if they pledge allegiance to Erdoğan. The Gülen Movement, the Süleymanlılar Community, and the Furkan Foundation—which do not pledge allegiance—are considered unacceptable conservatives. Nationalist circles are made up of Ergenekon members, Eurasianists, and deep state actors. The most interesting segment is the Kurdish political faction. Previously, only the Hezbollah Party was in the coalition; now, Abdullah Öcalan—the PKK leader who was once booed in the streets—and the DEM Party have also been added.
As a country, we are going through interesting times. Özal’s “four tendencies” model has given way to a fluid “coalition of power” or “alliance” model centered around Erdoğan’s leadership. Özal’s 1983 policy of uniting the four trends had been successful and yielded positive results. Özal’s model was synthesizing. Erdoğan’s model is leader-centered and divisive. Erdoğan’s model has already divided society. The AKP is struggling to explain to the public why Öcalan—once labeled a “terrorist leader” or “baby killer”—is now being called a “peace coordinator,” and why a veiled amnesty is being granted to PKK terrorists. It cannot explain why a conservative party is carrying out one operation after another against conservative religious communities and foundations.
The entire country will learn the consequences of this alliance through firsthand experience. Özal’s four-pronged approach had brought Turkey back to the center and strengthened it. As for where Erdoğan’s four-party alliance will lead Turkey, the verdict will be delivered not by politics, but by time and history.
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