Established during a period of waning political trust in Turkey, can the New Party respond to the social opposition’s search for hope? In this article, drawing on the experiences of past political movements, the author assesses how this new political force fares in terms of trust, inclusivity, and a distinctive voice.
It may be a familiar and overused phrase, but politics in Turkey has long since ceased to be a source of solutions and has instead become, in effect, the source of problems. For this reason, trust in the political system is at an all-time low. It is clear that to find a way out of this situation, we need to rebuild that lost trust and establish a new party that can serve as the focal point for society’s expectations of a solution.
The New Party, founded by members who split from the CHP under the leadership of Özgür Özel and Ekrem İmamoğlu, appears to have sparked excitement among the public right from the start. Whether this excitement spreads in waves, takes root and grows, and transforms into a lasting political hope will be directly linked to the party’s actions in the coming days, its rhetoric, the philosophical (not ideological) foundation on which it builds its politics, and its principled approach to addressing issues. To put it plainly, the fate of the New Party will be determined by the rebuilding of trust—which has suffered significant damage for quite some time—between social opposition and institutional politics (regarding both ruling and opposition parties).
Remembering History
Hundreds of political parties have been founded in Turkish politics, but very few of them have been able to build a strong bond and trust with the public by implementing their own platforms that align with the people’s demands. Looking back chronologically at the successful ones, the Democratic Party of the 1950s managed to rally the public behind it with the slogan “Enough—the people have the final say.” What made this party appealing and helped it win a place in the hearts of the people was its ability to articulate, in a clearer, more precise, open, and bold manner, the issues on which it differed from the ruling CHP when it split from that party.
In the 1960s, Demirel’s Justice Party succeeded in coming to power by presenting itself to the public as a force that emphasized increased industrialization, economic initiatives, and the hardships suffered in the wake of the May 27 Coup. In the 1970s, the CHP, led by Bülent Ecevit, repositioned itself sociopolitically with the slogans “The land belongs to those who till it, the water to those who use it” and “Neither oppressor nor oppressed; a humane, just order.” Thus, Ecevit’s CHP—which became famous under the nickname “Karaoğlan”—reached its historic peak by securing approximately 41 percent of the vote. Accordingly, while Demirel’s emphasis on justice and industrialization in the 1960s resonated with the public, Ecevit’s political doctrine in the 1970s—which prioritized the individual and society over the state and the elite—also found support among the people.
In the 1980s, however, another leader managed to resonate with the public. That person was Turgut Özal, known for his pragmatic approach, his economist’s perspective, and his qualities as a resolute leader. Özal became a pioneer of industrial transformation and freedoms in Turkey by emphasizing the slogan “great transformation” and terms such as “freedom of enterprise, conscience, thought, and expression.” The vision of a new economic model, the country’s opening to the international community, and his emphasis on change were the qualities that enabled Özal to rally the masses behind him. He was genuine. He was at peace with himself. He was open to the world and, at the same time, possessed the maturity to laugh off criticism, just like the leaders who came before him. Perhaps today’s youth may not realize it, but back then, criticizing the country’s leaders was not the most common shortcut (!) to ending up in prison.
The 1990s can be described as a lost era in Turkish politics. It is unlikely that we can point to a new leader—or leaders—who stood out in a truly unique way, either in terms of their philosophy or their actions.
In the 2000s, Erdoğan emerged by emphasizing issues such as “Poverty,” “Restrictions,” and “the Fight Against Corruption,” and found a strong resonance among the public. This new leader had stated that he had shed his political Islamist image and frequently reiterated that he had placed democracy, the rule of law, and the European Union accession process at the center of his political agenda. He also promised to build a “Strong Turkey” and, in doing so, to remove the obstacles to democracy and freedom—that is, to fight against restrictions. In addition to his emphasis on the rich-poor divide, income inequality, and equitable distribution, his pledge to wage a comprehensive fight against poverty also sparked enthusiasm among the masses. Another political message of Erdoğan’s that resonated with the public was his manifesto for a “comprehensive fight against corruption.” With these messages securing public support, things seemed to be going smoothly during the first ten years of Erdoğan’s rule.
However, as reflected in the words “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s transition from a shy dictator to a dictator at peace with his own identity…” reflects the author’s assessment that, during the 24 years Erdoğan has governed the country, the veneer of the “three Y’s” of Erdoğanism has worn away, and we are now in an era where the new version of the old Erdoğan has taken control of the country. The synergy that emerged in 2002 when Erdoğan won the public’s favor and achieved gains that held out hope for politics—and the social excitement he generated as a result— failed to sustain his pro-people stance by persistently advocating for issues such as democracy, freedom, the rule of law, justice, the fight against corruption, and the eradication of poverty. On the contrary, having come to power through the strength of the people during his leadership, he chose to maintain his rule by relying on state power over the years. At this stage, today’s Turkey not only holds the worst records in every area—from income inequality to human rights violations—but also faces criticism that trust in the justice system has plummeted to levels not even seen during coup eras—and where criticism is mounting that dissenting voices are being suppressed through the judiciary, assessments are becoming widespread that a large portion of the media is under control, and democracy is virtually nowhere to be found—it has been dragged into a vortex of fear and despair.
When we take a brief look back at Turkish politics to refresh our memory, it is impossible to name a leader who has maintained power for as long as the Erdoğan regime. Today, we face the reality of an Erdoğan who, despite having set a course completely opposite to what he promised and effectively overturning his original manifesto, still governs Turkey (for 24 years). While all indicators in the country resemble the instrument panel of a crashing plane, Erdoğan is still, surprisingly, managing to hold on to power. According to the author’s assessment, the secret to this seems to lie in the design of the institutional opposition, linked to the use of power derived from the state and public resources. Indeed, while the Erdoğan regime struggles to recapture its former popularity among the public, the failure of the opposition’s vote share to increase as expected can be interpreted as a result of the ruling party’s strategy of maintaining a controlled and fragmented opposition. Thanks to this controlled opposition, even if his own vote share does not increase, the policy of keeping opponents away from the ballot box or continuing on his path by fragmenting the opposition can rightly be attributed to Erdoğan’s political cunning (or, as some call it, political genius).
The Political Rhetoric and Sociopolitical Basis of the New
Erdoğan’s political strategies in question may backfire on him this time. As the New Party enters the country’s political scene—precisely as one of the unforeseeable consequences of this political maneuvering—it could break the political deadlock; it could be the new hope for the angry, undecided, or silent masses and for the country as a whole.
The country’s political history shows that one of the common traits shared by all political leaders who have resonated significantly with society is their ability to accurately gauge the spirit of the times (either partially or completely). It is worth noting that the stances of these leaders were shaped not only by their opposition to the status quo, conventional wisdom, or impositions, but also by their reliance on the people rather than the state, and by their demonstration of political courage when and where necessary. Furthermore, when examining the political and social context in which successful political movements of the past emerged, it becomes evident that: the ruling power’s rhetoric and actions, rather than generating hope and excitement, have led to anger and weariness; becoming the focus of complaints rather than solutions, or a growing disconnect between their rhetoric and actions—all of these factors have led to a transformation in the structure of the opposition and, ultimately, caused the resulting social opposition to seek out new avenues capable of providing solutions to current problems.
In today’s Turkey, when one considers the undecided voters, protest votes, and votes cast for various opposition parties, it can be said that a significant portion of the public has grown weary of Erdoğan’s rule, and that a considerable number of these opponents even harbor anger toward the government. Thus, we can say that the mainstream of the public has turned its back on the current administration, albeit for different reasons. However, a major dilemma faced by these groups—who have turned their backs on the government—is that they have been unable to find an opposition figure they can follow and trust (especially given the disappointment caused by the opposition leaders they have voted for over the years).
It is clear that the ground is ripe for a new political movement. It is also reasonable to expect that the objections raised by Özel and İmamoğlu’s team—namely, that judicial proceedings are shaping the political landscape—will resonate with the public. Furthermore, the public, weary of problems in the social, economic, legal, and democratic spheres, is giving rise to a spontaneous and strong social opposition.
In light of these developments, it appears that, for the new political movement led by Özel and İmamoğlu, there are not only many pitfalls and challenges but also a significant window of opportunity. However, any success achieved will be directly linked to what those opportunities are and how they are capitalized upon. The fate of the New Party will be determined in the coming days by both the lessons it draws from Turkish political history and its ability to accurately interpret the current political climate; its political lifespan will also be shaped by the steps it takes and the strategic moves it makes. The existence of a new political ecosystem—born of legitimate justifications and social synergy—serves as a reminder to Özel and İmamoğlu that they face a historic responsibility as the country’s politics navigates a historic turning point.
We can list the steps the new political movement must take to effectively translate its advantages into action as follows: It would be beneficial for them to combine their wisdom with their courage, avoiding being trapped by history while also drawing positive lessons from their own past to inform their perspective on the present. Furthermore, rather than grappling with the burdens of the past, they can focus on how to solve today’s problems and lay out the promises of the future. Another priority for them should be to accurately analyze—in all its aspects and components—the social opposition group within the public that has rallied behind this movement with high expectations, and to develop political policies, discourses, and proposed solutions that meet those expectations. The new political movement’s ability to evaluate these two key realities simultaneously—using this approach and perspective—will be the determining factor in its success.
In the face of Erdoğan’s administration—which has faced criticism for becoming increasingly authoritarian over time—a new political movement and discourse rooted in society and prioritizing the individual The New Party must have the courage to articulate its position not with timidity, but with at least as much confidence and transparency as the repressive administration it opposes. It is a crucial responsibility of the New Party to develop policies that will address the disillusionment felt by the masses who have drifted away from the ruling party—in other words, the social opposition—toward the institutional opposition. In particular, it must establish its own political syntax and style of expression by distancing itself from the demonizing, othering, antagonizing, devaluing, divisive, or stigmatizing concepts used by the current ruling party. Therefore, the New Party must develop its own original concepts within the framework of the values and principles it champions, and distinguish itself through a new political style and approach aimed at reaching the public with its own positive political discourse. Such a methodology must never be neglected, especially given that the question “What exactly is new about the ‘New’?” will be constantly raised.
To the extent that this new movement distinguishes itself from an authoritarian and oppressive political approach that relies on the state and wields state power, it will meet the people’s expectations and become a source of hope for them. In particular, a communication strategy based on genuine and sincere discourse—aimed at overcoming the trust issues that current political actors have created among the public—will be another decisive factor in the new movement’s success. Otherwise, if the ruling party’s style of politics and political terminology are even partially adopted, the new movement will quickly (and largely without realizing it) mentally confine itself within the playing field defined by the ruling party, rapidly become outdated, and narrow its room for maneuver. The fundamental reason why many political parties established over the past fifteen years have failed to sustain the initial excitement they generated is their surrender to the ruling party’s mindset and discourse. In fact, every ambitious new political movement exerts influence over the masses and grows in direct proportion to how clearly it demonstrates its distinction from the opposition; it builds trust in society through its inclusivity and authenticity, and can sustain the excitement it generates by offering realistic solutions.
Image Source: https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2026/0525/1575065-turkey-politics/
